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This contribution aims to give an overview of the historical context of neutrino physics. I will
present the strong social trends that shaped physics and the way physicists worked, along the
20th century. First, we will see the background of the birth of nuclear physics in the interwar
period. Then, we will examine the deep implications the Second World War had, to conclude
with the specificities of post-war years for nuclear and particle physics.
1 Early Neutrino Physics: The Interwar Period
I have to say, to introduce this short paper, that I am not a specialist in particle physics or
particle physics history. So, what could a generalist historian of science bring to a conference
full of experts in neutrino physics? Maybe a way to shift the focus a bit. I will consider it
as my job here to convince you that the history of the neutrino, is not only a history of great
intellectual discoveries and wonderful new techniques, but also from end to end a history of the
20th century. A history of nations, politics and war. A history of institutions and social changes,
all deeply intertwined, that can enlighten the strong trends inside which neutrino physics has
evolved, and will continue to.
This history starts during the interwar period, as several authors have reminded us. It is
precisely at this time that the way of doing science, and physics especially, started to resemble
something we know nowadays. Actually, the interwar period was a period of major changes for
science that we cannot understand without calling back to the beginning of the century and
particularly the First World War.
Let us remind ourselves briefly what physics looked like at the turn of the century. An
overwhelming majority of physicists were working in Western Europe. American universities
were still small and distant institutions, in a quickly developing but isolated country. Most
scholars, who were not yet named researchers, were still amateurs, living off of personal resources,
teaching or business activities, or patronage and various grants. Work was essentially individual
or organized between small groups of people, and what we could call “laboratory work” was
often led at private residences and not in universities. Leading papers were written in German
or Frencha. And science was mainly seen among society as an enjoyable inquiry with moral
involvement more than a material or economic one.
Finally, the existence of atoms had just been completely accepted, and the physics of radia-
tion was bursting into an explosion of new observations the likes of which fundamental physics
had not known for a while. The experiments stemming from this whole new continent became
the building blocks of quantum theory.
aEven later, early 1934, Enrico Fermi wrote his famous paper on beta-decay theory simultaneously in Italian
(Nuovo Cimento) and in German (Zeitschrift fu¨r Physik). It has been translated in English much later.
In this landscape, the First World War was probably the event having the most profound
consequences on 20th-century science, on par with or maybe even having more impact than the
Second World War.
Scientists played a very important role throughout the war. Aviation was used for the first
time in a conflict. Submarine use became significant. Chemists developed poisonous gases.
Heavy artillery demanded more and more ballistic computations. And meanwhile, the twice
nobelized Marie Curie developed medical radiology to help the Red Cross treating the countless
injured soldiers. At the same time, the total war, produced by the clash of the imperialisms
among European states, involved the entire societies, resting upon nationalist ideologies. All of
this led ruling elites and each nation’s society to think of their scientists as a highly useful tool
for power. And even if we usually date the end of the First World War in 1918, this schema
actually persisted more or less until the Second World War.
What have been the consequences for physics? Firstly, the professionalization of scientists.
The importance of science for national power, and the new prominence taken by the state in
each nation’s society together made science a political and national aim. At the same time,
the terrible social conditions of the war aftermath had broken the fragile equilibrium between
personal resources and private fundings that once had permitted some scientists to live and work.
The time had come to construct national public scientific organizations with staff researchers. In
France, it was the CNRS, Centre national de la recherche scientifique, planned by the government
of the Popular Front and the first undersecretary for scientific research, Ire`ne Joliot-Curie,
daughter of Marie Curie and recipient of the 1935 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for the discovery of
artificial radioactivity. So, scientific research became a professional career during this interwar
period, something it had never really been before in European history.
Secondly, another direct outcome of this new social place for science —and especially physics—
was its incredible penetration into society as a whole, hand in hand with the rise of advertisement
(or propaganda) and the birth of consumerism. Modern physics became synonymous with the
power of a nation and with a radiant future. Institutions dedicated to popularization of science
were built, like the Palais de la De´couverte designed by Jean Perrin (Nobel Prize in Physics in
1926) in Paris. In France, the discovery of radium by Marie Curie inspired in just a few years
a now absurd trend of radium consumption. Advertisements were praising radioactive water, or
face cream; very good for the complexion, guaranteed! Or even radium talc for babies!
Finally, the war had been the accelerator that propelled the American economy to a world-
wide leading position. The center of gravity for physics was still in Germany, but the rapid
development of scientific institutions in the United States made the physics community experi-
ence a first kind of globalization across the Atlantic Ocean. The most famous example of this
internationalization of physics was the organization in Brussels, by the Belgian industrial Ernest
Solvay of a series of conferences, known as the “Solvay conferences”, more or less every three
years starting from 1911. A large part of the animated debates about the nature of the quantum
world and the correct theories to understand it took place there. In a way, these meetings were
the first international conferences of theoretical physics. Except that at the time, basically, all
theoretical physicists in the world could fit in a single room.
2 Nuclear Physics and the Second World War
We saw how deeply the way physicists’ work changed during the interwar period, and how these
changes were driven by a new role assigned to science by society. We will now address the next
main topic. The topic of the Second World War, obviously. This Second World War is so much
a pursuit of the first one, that it will of course point mostly towards the same directions.
One of the most impressive consequences was the tipping of the center of gravity for physics,
from Germanic countries to the United States, over the course of ten years. The events we
saw in the previous part had already laid out the field for the welcoming of a major part of
international physics on the other side of the Atlantic. But the trigger was obviously the rise to
power of the Nazis in Germany in 1933. Just among Jewish physicists, physicists with Jewish
family, or left-wing political opponents, the Germanic countries saw in a few years a whole part
of their scientific community fleeing central Europe. Erwin Schro¨dinger chose Ireland, Max Born
the United Kingdom and Lise Meitner Sweden. But for most of them, the United States had
become the most natural destination. Among the most famous ones, we could name Albert
Einstein, Niels Bohr, Enrico Fermi, Wolfgang Pauli, Hans Bethe and Leo Szilard. And most
of them stayed in the United States once the war was over. Europe was then a devastated
battleground, particularly Germany, who was placed under Allied administration. And more
decisive, the economic domination of the United States became far stronger than it had become
in the wake of the First War. For the second time in thirty years, the United States became
the creditor of the European war effort, and decided to fund the reconstruction in exchange for
massive import of American products. This was known as the Marshall Plan.
At the same time, the combination of the national scientific institutions of the interwar period
with the abrupt conversion of countries to war economy, especially in the United Kingdom and
the United States, led to an incredible intensification of the previous trends. Historians of
science have called this new regime of science, completed with the Second World War, Big
Science. How Big? Big in several meanings. First, because of a quantitative explosion. Of
the number of scientists as well as the national spendings. Estimated research spendings for
the United States were multiplied a thousandfold between 1935 and 1945. Second, because
of the organization of scientific work in big laboratories mobilizing hundreds to thousands of
researchers. And finally, because of the organization of this work around large instruments, like
particle accelerators, large telescopes or computers.
Since the states were generously funding these activities, it was decided to fix practical goals
to scientists, decided by a central administration, and to organize research in collaborative units,
not unlike industrial organization. Around these practical goals that could help to win the war,
multidisciplinary teams were established, with almost unlimited funds. All across the United
States and the United Kingdom, scientists were enlisted like this, with the idea that scientific
achievements could decide the outcome of the world conflict.
And in a way it did. The leading position acquired by Great Britain in the development of
RADAR technologies during the conflict were of the highest importance for the Navy and the
Air force. The field of operations research appeared, combining computation and mathematical
analysis, to help solve the huge organizational issues of the war. Cybernetics and information
theory arose from the study of communication problems and automatic guidance for air defense
systems. And we have to mention the development of digital computers, for ballistic calculations
or codebreaking. The movie The Imitation Game about the work of Alan M. Turing during the
war recently popularized the importance of cracking German intelligence codes for defeating the
German naval blockade of Great Britain.
And, above all, “the bomb”, obviously. I will not stay long on this well-known story. Just
a few remarks on the importance of this episode for fundamental physics development. From
the first publication on nuclear fission in 1939, to the Hiroshima bombing, only six years had
passed. During this interval, the handful of nuclear physicists in the world informed of these
works alerted their governments about the potential military use of this fundamental discovery.
All open publication on this topic stopped. And in 1945, the most frightful weapon ever built by
humankind killed 70,000 people instantly, and 200,000 more during the next five years, in one
unique explosion. I think there is no need to stress more the importance took by fundamental
physics in the 20th century.
The team of Fre´de´ric Joliot-Curie, in Paris, was probably the most advanced on this subject
in 1939, but he preferred to stay in the occupied France and all their work stopped until the
end of the war1. Meanwhile, Robert Oppenheimer was charged by Roosevelt to be the scientific
leader of the Manhattan Project. A large number of the most brilliant physicists, who had fled
central Europe just some years ago, worked with him on the atomic bomb, with the assistance of
more than one hundred and fifty thousand engineers, technicians and workers across the United
States. The physicists’ team founded the laboratory of Los Alamos —a kind of secret city built
in the middle of nowhere in New Mexico— which basically became the prototype of modern
fundamental physics laboratories. For the study of the nuclear detonation, it is there that the
mathematician Stanislaw Ulam invented the Monte Carlo methods and proceeded to the first
computer simulations in history.
For scientists, this Big Science meant a loss of their autonomy. They were no longer the ones
to decide on their research priorities, instrument choices or colleagues. Concurrently, military
power was not, for the first time, a demographic issue, but a scientific one. And if the state could
discipline and organize scientific research, this scientific issue could become itself an economic
one. This situation led to a kind of historical mutual compromise between scientists and political
power. This compromise was set out in the most famous and clearest way by Vannevar Bush,
MIT researcher on computers and scientific advisor of then President Roosevelt, in a public
report to the President of the United States published in 1945. Its title was Science: The
Endless Frontier 2.
Bush was requesting the perpetuation of the national budgets without limit, like those they
had known during the War, but argued for an ideal of autonomy for “pure science”. In exchange,
society and political power could count on rapid return on investment, in terms of economic
growth and military applications. With the example of nuclear physics in mind, fundamental
physicists encountered no difficulty to convince military authorities to pay huge amounts to
let them investigate whatever research lines they would like. Something big and useful would
certainly come out of this one day or another!
Obviously this solution established itself thanks to the context of the Cold War, as we are
going to see in the last part. Indeed, we have not talked at all about the USSR until now, which
however was maybe the first country to enter in this Big Science regime, despite its economic
weakness compared to the United States.
3 The Cold War, Golden Age of Particle Physics?
We saw the compromise between scientists and political power at the close of the War that
historians call Big Science. This compromise had been stabilized by the constant preparedness
for war that the United States, Europe, and the USSR continued to experience during thirty
years. This period is obviously what we know as the cold war, and was also a kind of Golden Age
for nuclear and particle physics, alongside space sciences, that ensured spendings to continue
to flow and the number of scientists involved to grow. Spendings were coming from the states,
and from national companies, since these countries knew during this period a constant economic
growth borne by the states protection and investments towards national industries. Eisenhower
dubbed this intricacy among the state, scientific research, industry, and military goals in a
famous speech in 1961 as “the military-industrial complex”.
This led to the invention of the concept of research & development in these big national
companies. The idea that we could apply the methods of organization of scientific research
invented during the war to innovation for the industry, with cycles from fundamental research
to industrial applications. In the United States the most famous example was Bell Labs, created
by the monopolistic phone company AT&T. From Bell Labs came an impressive number of
Nobel Prizes and breakthroughs that contributed in a major way to communication technologies
and material sciences. We could practically say that the modern field of condensed matter
physics emerged there. To give an idea, we could name Claude Shannon, who wrote there his
mathematical theory of communication during the war, Arthur Schawlow and Charles Townes
who built the first Laser in 1960 (in parallel with a Soviet team), Arno Penzias and Robert
Wilson who discovered the cosmic microwave background in 1964, or John Bardeen William
Shochkley and Walter House Brattain who produced in 1947 the invention that maybe changed
the second half of the 20th century in the most profound way: the transistor, that gave birth to
the whole field of microelectronics.
In France, the best example of this intricacy between industry, fundamental physics, and
military goals, was the creation of the Commissariat a` l’e´nergie atomique (CEA) in 1945, under
the direction of the famous physicist Fre´de´ric Joliot-Curie and Raoul Dautry, former minister
for weaponry. The first goal of the CEA was to take over the work Joliot-Curie and his team
stopped in 1939 on nuclear fission, and be among the first after the Americans to produce a
reactor based on controlled nuclear chain fission. This was done in 1948.
In Europe, the intricacy between political goals, industry, and science took a specific shape
with the construction of a European union. Far from nowadays European Union, the aim was to
create an intergovernmental space between the states that were opposed during the conflict, to
share strategic technologies and resources, and thus ensure the end of the national rivalries that
made the first half of the century. This was done with the European Coal and Steel Community,
pooling these strategic industries for war economies together. And of course with nuclear science
and industry with the EURATOM organization and the CERN.
I will not say too much about the CERN, because a lot of people contributing to this
conference know far better than me this story. But I think I have set the scene to see more
clearly the very special historical moment that allowed this unique project: the sharing of the
most frightening science and technologies that came out of the war, between former enemies, for
civil uses.
However, this compromise of the Big Science was a critical deal for a lot of scientists. Hi-
roshima had been, of course, a moral rupture for a lot of physicists. Fundamental science would
no longer be considered as a neutral and purely intellectual adventure. Fundamental science
can be harmful by itself. On their side, medicine and biology had Auschwitz. Eugenics had
been invented as a medical specialty, with its journals and learned societies, advocating for mass
sterilization for the greater good. And the trial of the Nazi doctors who enjoyed to experiment
freely on humans in the extermination camps led to the Nuremberg Code in 1947 —the first
international text for ethics principles restricting human subject experimentations.
In the same movement, nuclear weapons had become the physicists’ burden. To index the
freedom of physicists to decide on their research lines, on the power capacity they could give to
their country starts to be a problem, when the consequences of their research can be so big and
tragic. And so, a lot of physicists, even those who worked on the Manhattan Project, started
to join the pacifist movement and campaigned for denuclearization. Not all of them, of course.
John von Neumann or Edward Teller fell on bad terms with their former colleagues for their
support of the thermonuclear bomb program. But Oppenheimer and Sakharov —the leader of
the soviet nuclear program— made their public soul-searching some years after. Leo Szilard,
who wrote the famous letter to Roosevelt signed by Einstein in 1939 that led to the Manhattan
Project, initiated a petition in July 1945, signed by a hundred of physicists, to ask president
Truman to use the bomb against Japan only if surrender discussions would not succeed. This
petition was banned, but Szilard and Einstein created the Emergency Committee of Atomic
Scientists the year after to publicly contest the development of nuclear weapons. Linus Pauling
won fame campaigning alongside Szilard and Einstein, and finally became recipient of the Nobel
Peace Prize in 1962. Joliot-Curie, in France, initiated the international Stockholm Appeal in
1950, calling for an international ban on nuclear weapons. He was then dismissed from the head
of the CEA, and after his departure, the CEA finally engaged in the production of the French
atomic bomb.
I would like to mention one last important feature of this period, concerning especially parti-
cle physics. The quantitative expansion and the new way to organize big collaborations between
different specialties, born in the war, led to an impressive diversification of subspecialties, par-
ticularly in microphysics. The historian of science Peter Galison produced a masterful analysis
of this evolution 3. He showed how different communities and experimental traditions came to
work together in huge collaborations around big instruments like the accelerators. These subcul-
tures can be organized around experimental, theoretical, instrument-making, or data analysis
goals. Each of these communities follows its own scientific aims, and works in a way modeled
by its own material culture, but develops communication interface with the others, that Galison
dubbed trading zones, where a specific language, mixing vocabularies coming from the different
scientific subcultures, is used. This fragmentation-cooperation, very specific to contemporary
physics, dissolved the very notion of the author of a scientific result, as a lot of the contributions
to this conference show.
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